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Abstract: This paper studies the econometric problems associated with estimation of a stochastic process that is endogenously
sampled. Our interest is to infer the law of motion of a discrete-time stochastic process
￿
pt













￿ that depend on the outcome of a probabilistic sampling rule that depends on the history of the process as well as
other observed covariates xt. We focus on a particular example where pt denotes the daily wholesale price of a standardized steel
product. However there are no formal exchanges or centralized markets where steel is traded and pt can be observed. Instead
nearly all steel transaction prices are a result of private bilateral negotiations between buyers and sellers, typically intermediated
by middlemen known as steel service centers. Even though there is no central record of daily transactions prices in the steel
market, we do observe transaction prices for a particular ﬁrm — a steel service center that purchases large quantities of steel in
the wholesale market for subsequent resale in the retail market. The endogenous sampling problem arises from the fact that the
ﬁrm only records pt on the days that it purchases steel. We present a parametric analysis of this problem under the assumption
that the timing of steel purchases is part of an optimal trading strategy that maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected discounted trading
proﬁts. We derive a parametric partial information maximum likelihood (PIML) estimator that solves the endogenous sampling




￿ process. The PIML estimator also yields estimates of the structural parameters that determine the optimal
trading rule. We also introduce an alternative consistent, less efﬁcient, but computationally simpler simulated minimum distance
(SMD) estimator that avoids high dimensional numerical integrations required by the PIML estimator. Using the SMD estimator,
we provide estimates of a truncated lognormal AR(1) model of the wholesale price processes for particular types of steel plate.
We use this to infer the share of the middleman’s discounted proﬁts that are due to markups paid by its retail customers, and the
share due to price speculation. The latter measures the ﬁrm’s success in forecasting steel prices and in timing its purchases in
order to “buy low and sell high”. The more successful the ﬁrm is in speculation (i.e. in strategically timing its purchases), the
more serious are the potential biases that would result from failing to account for the endogeneity of the sampling process.
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This paper studies the econometric problems associated with estimation of a stochastic process that is
endogenously sampled. Our interest is to infer the law of motion of a discrete-time stochastic process
￿
pt












￿ that depend on the outcome of a probabilistic
sampling rule that depends on the history of the process as well as other observed covariates xt. We focus
on a particular example where pt denotes the daily wholesale price of a standardized steel product. There
are no formal markets or centralized exchanges where steel is traded. Instead nearly all steel transaction
prices are a result of private bilateral negotiations between buyers and sellers, typically intermediated by
middlemen known as steel service centers.1 Even though there is no central record of daily transactions
prices in the steel market, we do observe transaction prices for a particular ﬁrm — a steel service center
that purchases large quantities of steel in the wholesale market for subsequent resale in the retail market.
The endogenous sampling problem arises from the fact that the ﬁrm only records pt on the days that is
purchases steel.
We introduce the endogenous sampling problem in the context of price speculation in the steel market
in order to provide a concrete example. However we believe that similar endogenous sampling problems
arise in many other contexts. Examples include ﬁnancial applications where transaction prices are ob-
served at randomly spaced intervals (see A¨ ıt-Sahalia and Mykland, 2001, Engle and Russell, 1999, and
Russell and Engle, 1998), and in marketing applications where the prices of goods that a household pur-
chases are generally only recorded for the items the household purchased and on the dates it purchased
them (see Allenby, McCulloch and Rossi 1996, and Erdem and Keane, 1996). However we are not aware
of any econometric literature that is directly relevant for handling endogenous sampling problems in a time
series context. The most directly related work is the literature on likelihood-based methods for correcting
for endogenous sampling in cross-sectional and panel contexts (Heckman, 1981, Manski and McFadden,
1981, and McFadden, 1997).
We present a parametric analysis of the endogenous sampling problem under the maintained assump-
tion that the timing of steel purchases is part of an optimal trading strategy that maximizes the ﬁrm’s ex-
1It is a puzzle why centralized exchanges exist for some commodities such as pork bellies, but not for steel. Rust and
Hall (2003) develop a theory of intermediation in which the microstructure of trade in a commodity or asset is endogenously
determined. Depending on the parameters of this model there are equilibria consistent with all trade occurring via a market
maker on a centralized exchange, or all trade occurring via decentralized transactions with middlemen,, or trade segmenting
between middlemen and market makers. This theory could explain the variety of different trading institutions that we see in
different markets, including the nonexistence of centralized exchanges for steel.
1pected discounted trading proﬁts. We derive a parametric partial information maximum likelihood (PIML)
estimator that solves the endogenous sampling problem and efﬁciently estimates the unknown parameters
of the Markov law of motion for
￿
pt
￿ together with the structural parameters that determine the optimal
trading rule. We also introduce an alternative consistent, less efﬁcient, but computationally simpler sim-
ulated minimum distance (SMD) estimator that avoids high dimensional numerical integrations required
by the PIML estimator. The SMD estimator can also be viewed as a simulated moments estimator (SME)
(Lee and Ingram, 1991 and Dufﬁe and Singleton, 1993), applied to a situation where the data are endoge-
nously sampled. Using the SMD estimator, we estimate the parameters of a truncated lognormal AR(1)
model of the wholesale price processes for particular types of steel plate. We use these estimates to infer
the share of the ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts that are due to markups paid by its retail customers, and the share
due to price speculation. The latter measures the ﬁrm’s success in forecasting steel prices and in timing
its purchases in order to “buy low and sell high”. The more successful the ﬁrm is in speculation (i.e. in
strategically timing its purchases), the more serious are the potential biases that would result from failing
to account for the endogeneity of the sampling process.
This paper originated from previous work (Hall and Rust, 1999, 2000 and 2001) on modeling the
speculative trading and inventory investment decisions of a particular steel wholesaler. This ﬁrm does
minimal production processing: its main activity is to stockpile quantities of various types of steel via bulk
purchases at wholesale prices from steel producers and other large intermediaries in order to proﬁt from
subsequent resale to retail customers at a mark-up. This ﬁrm has provided us with a unique new data set
with daily observations on purchases and sales of the more than 2,300 products it carries. While these data
are unique in their level of detail and quality, the ﬁrm does not record any prices in its computerized data
base unless a purchase, sale, or adjustment occurs. The essence of the endogenous sampling problem is




￿ denotethe stochastic process representing the lowestpriceoffered by any seller of a particular
steel product on day t. We assume that the ﬁrm observes pt at each day t, but it only records pt when it
decidestoplaceanorder. Letqo
t denotethequantityorders(purchased)ondayt. Theendogenoussampling








It is notationally convenient to treat the endogenous sampling problem as a censored sampling problem:
i.e., we set pt to some arbitrary value such as pt
￿ 0 when qo
t
￿ 0, and let pt equal the observed purchase
2pricewhen qo
t









￿ can provide a key source of information for learning about
￿
pt
￿ . However on the subset of days
where both pt and pr
t are observed, we observe that markups pr
t
￿ pt are quite volatile, and vary by time,
location, and type of the customer. In other words, there is considerable price discrimination in the retail
market for steel. As a result the retail price of steel pr
t is best regarded as a noisy and biased signal of the
wholesale price pt and therefore the retail price may not provide information that is directly relevant for
estimating the unknown parameters of the wholesale price process.2
The estimation methods we propose requires nested numerical solution of a dynamic programming
problem that determine the ﬁrm’s optimal trading strategy. This must be done for each trial value for the
unknown parameter vector q, and as a result, the estimators we propose are computationally intensive.
However signiﬁcant computational savings can be achieved by exploiting special features of the solutions
to these dynamic programming problems. Extending a seminal result by Scarf (1959) for a simpler class
of inventory investment problems, Hall and Rust (2001) showed that the optimal speculative investment








￿ rule, S and s
￿ are functions of the current wholesale price p and a vector
of other state variables x such as interest rates, demand shifters, and other variables that affect the ﬁrm’s























￿ is the ﬁrm’s order threshold: it is optimal for the ﬁrm to place an order whenever its








￿ is the ﬁrm’s target inventory level:
whenever the ﬁrm places an order to replenish its inventory, it orders an amount sufﬁcient to insure that





2Our treatment of the wholesale price process
￿
pt
￿ as an exogenously speciﬁed “forcing process” that is known up to a
ﬁnite number of parameters is admittedly only a ﬁrst approximation to reality. The assumptions that
￿
pt
￿ is observed each
day by the ﬁrm and evolves as an exogenous stochastic process (i.e. its realizations do not depend on actions of the ﬁrm)
are particularly strong restrictions that we intend to relax in future work. As we noted above, prices in the steel market are
determined via bilateral negotiations: there is no central market place where the lowest price can be easily observed. Instead,
in order to get price quotes, purchasing agents within the ﬁrm must communicate with steel producers or other intermediaries
via telephone, fax, telex, or recently, the WWW. Thus each price quote involves a small monetary and time cost. However
this leads potential endogeneity problems, since the best price the ﬁrm is able to negotiate depends on the intensity of its
search/bargaining process, and this intensity level could vary depending on the conditions it faces. We defer the difﬁcult
issues associated with potential endogeneity in
￿
pt
￿ to future research. However while a more realistic model of speculation
would result in a more complicated dynamic programming problem, we believe the general approaches to estimation of the
underlying price processes described in this paper will still apply. The main modiﬁcation is that when there is no central
wholesale market and the “law of one price” does not hold, we would need to estimate a conditional probability distribution
representing the ﬁrm’s beliefs about the distribution of potential prices available at a given point in time.




￿ is the source of the endogenous sampling problem since the ﬁrm
only records the wholesale price p on those days where a purchase occurs. Therefore the endogenous
sampling rule can be restated as the following threshold rule:
























￿ rule as our model of the endogenous determination of








The main idea behind the likelihood based approach to solving the endogenous sampling problem is
to write down a likelihood that reﬂects a correctly speciﬁed probability law for the endogenous sampling
scheme. In some cases, consistent, but less efﬁcient quasi-maximum likelihood and GMM estimators
have been proposed. These estimators work by appropriately re-weighting the observations to adjust for
the effects of non-random sampling, similar in some respects to the way the conditional probabilities in
the likelihood reﬂect an appropriate weighting of the outcomes. We follow this general strategy in this
paper, and propose a partial information maximum likelihood (PIML) estimator that is consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed. However the PIML estimator requires high dimensional numerical
integrations that can only be feasibly done via recursive quadrature, or by Monte Carlo or quasi-Monte
Carlo methods.
We introduce an alternative less efﬁcient but computationally simpler simulated minimum distance
(SMD) estimator that does not attempt to re-weight the observations in order to insure consistency and
thus avoids the need for high dimensional integrations. The SMD estimator only relies on the ability to
simulate realizations oftheoptimaltrading model. Thesesimulations arethencensoredinexactlythesame
way as the observed data are censored, an approach that is similar in many respects to the strategy of “data
augmentation” used in Bayesian inference of latent variable models. The idea behind the SMD estimator is
to choose parameter values that result in simulated moments that match the observed moments as closely
as possible, where both the real and simulated data are censored according to the same sampling rule;
namely the one given in equation (1). Even though the moments entering the SMD criterion are biased
and inconsistent due to the endogenous sampling problem, the fact that we can censor the data entering the
4simulated and real moments in the same way implies that the SMD estimator itself is consistent. It should
be apparent that although the two estimation methods we present here are specialized to our particular steel
example, it should be straightforward to generalize these methods to other types of endogenous sampling
problems that arise in a variety of other contexts.
Section 2 describes our data set and introduces the steel speculation and inventory problem that moti-
vates this research. Section 3 presents a parametric, full information approach to inference using a gener-
alization of a model of optimal commodity price speculation and inventory investment developed in Hall
and Rust (1999, 2000, 2001). An independent contribution of this section is to provide a tractable spec-
iﬁcation for unobserved state variables affecting the speculator’s trading decisions that accounts for the
frequently binding inequality constraints that purchases of steel must be non-negative. The fact that this
constraint is strictly binding at qo
t
￿ 0 prevents the use of standard Euler equation methods to uncover the
trader’s decision rule and the associated endogenous sampling rule for wholesale steel prices. By intro-
ducing an unobserved state variable, we derive a nondegenerate conditional probability distribution for qo
t











￿ . We establish the consistency of the PIML estimator by showing that the values
of the joint process
￿
xti
￿ on successive purchase dates ti (when all components of xt are observed) is an
embedded Markov chain. This allows us to invoke a standard Information Inequality argument to establish
the consistency of the PIML estimator. Via a standard Taylor series approximation and an appeal to an
appropriate Central Limit Theorem for mixing processes, it is possible to establish the asymptotic normal-
ity of the PIML estimator. Section 4 introduces the simulated minimum distance estimator and derives
its asymptotic distribution. Section 5 presents some initial Monte Carlo evidence on the performance of
the estimators proposed in this paper as well as results of an empirical application to several plate steel
products for which wholesale prices are assumed to evolve according to a univariate truncated lognormal
AR(1) process. We estimate the unknown parameters of the price process and the unknown parameters




￿ trading strategy ﬁts these data, and use our results to infer the fraction of the ﬁrm’s discounted proﬁts
are due to the markups it charges its retail customers, and the fraction that is due to pure commodity price
speculation, i.e., its success in timing purchases of steel in order to proﬁt from “buying low and selling
high.”
52 Description of the Data and the Model of Price Speculation
In this section we introduce the data and describe a generalized version of a model of commodity price
speculation introduced by Hall and Rust (1999, 2000, 2001) that allows for additional covariates and
unobserved state variables. This model provides the framework for inference and provides the key insights
that enabled us to pose and solve the endogenous sampling problem.
2.1 The Data
Via a personal contact with an executive at a large U.S. steel wholesaler, we acquired a new high frequency
micro database on transactions in the steel market. This ﬁrm has provided us with an ongoing data feed
that enables us to observe virtually all aspects of its operations, including the purchase and sale prices and
quantities and the identities of its customers for all of its 2300
￿ individual steel products on a daily basis.
The empirical results presented in section 5 are based on data on every transaction the ﬁrm made between
July 1, 1997 to March 14, 2002 (1191 business days) for two of its highest volume steel products. For each
transaction we observe the quantity (number of units and/or weight in pounds) of steel bought or sold, the
sales price, the shipping costs, and the identity of the buyer or seller.
Although this is an exceptionally clean and rich dataset, we only observe prices on the days the ﬁrm
actually made transactions: the ﬁrm does not record any price information on days that it does not transact
(either as a buyer or seller of steel). This shortcoming of our dataset is much more important for steel
purchases than steel sales, since the ﬁrm purchases new steel inventory in the wholesale market much less
frequently than it sells steel to its retail customers. Indeed, even for its highest volume products, it makes




￿ theory we present below predicts that purchases
are not made at random. Instead, the ﬁrm tends to make purchases when prices are low, so that the average
price on the days the ﬁrm makes purchases will be lower than the average wholesale price on days the
ﬁrm does not purchase. The exception to this general rule is that the ﬁrm may make purchases even when
prices are relatively high if its inventories are low. Conversely, the ﬁrm may refrain from purchasing even
if prices and inventories are low if it expects that the rate of retail sales will be depressed for a long period
of time, say due to bad macroeconomics conditions. Thus, while the ﬁrm is attempting to “buy low and
sell high”, its purchase decisions involve a tradeoff among a number of different considerations.
We illustrate our data by plotting the time series of inventories and prices of one of the ﬁrm’s products
in ﬁgures 1 and 2. This product, which we call product 4, is one of highest volume products sold by this
6ﬁrm. It is also a benchmark product within the industry since the prices of several other steel products are
often computed as a function of this product’s price. It is possible to get weekly and monthly survey data
on prices for certain classes of steel products through trade publications such as Purchasing Magazine
and American Metal Market. However, since there are no public exchange markets for steel products,
transaction in the steel market are carried out in private negotiations. Hence these price surveys rely
on participants in the steel market to report truthfully the prices they paid or received for various steel
products. The ﬁrm often faces considerably different prices than those in the survey data.
As a result, in our plots of wholesale transaction prices in ﬁgure 2 (the lower curve with the large black
circles), we used straight line interpolations between observed purchase prices at successive purchase
dates. The black circle at each purchase date is proportional to the size of the ﬁrm’s purchase in pounds.
This gives us our ﬁrst visual indication of the endogenous sampling problem. First, we see that even
though we have 1191 observations on this ﬁrm, we observe purchases in the wholesale market on only
184 days. Second, the patterns of the black dots suggests that the ﬁrm is more likely to purchase large
quantities of steel when wholesale prices are low, although other economic factors seem to be inﬂuencing
the ﬁrm’s purchase decisions as well. One key factor is the level of inventory: the ﬁrm tends to make large
purchases when its inventory is low. We also see that even though wholesale prices continued to decline
during 2000 and 2001, the ﬁrm’s largest purchases of steel occurred during the “turning point” in prices
in early 1998. The ﬁrm may have avoided making large purchases in late 2000 and 2001 due to economic
uncertainties resulting from the “dot com crash” and the economic uncertainties following the 9/11/2001
terrorist attack on the U.S.
Overall, our interpolated plot of steel wholesale prices in ﬁgure 2 suggests that we should be wary
of using the relatively small number of irregularly spaced observations to make inferences about the un-
derlying law of motion for
￿
pt
￿ . The observed purchase prices are unlikely to be representative of the
unconditional mean level of prices in the wholesale market (especially if the ﬁrm is attempting to “buying
low and sell high”), and the estimated serial correlation coefﬁcient for these irregularly spaced transac-
tions is unlikely to be a good estimate of the serial correlation coefﬁcient between daily wholesale prices
(assuming we were able to observe them).
Figure 2 also plots the interpolated sequence of daily retail sales prices. Retail sales occur on about
two out every three business days, so the amount of interpolation in the retail price series is modest. The
wholesale and retail prices move in a roughly parallel way, although there appears to be considerable day-




































































































Figure 2: Purchase prices (solid line) and retail prices (dashed line) for product 4. For the purchase price
series, the size of the marker is proportional to the size of the purchase.
8the high frequency variation is due to observable factors. Athreya (2002) ﬁnds that roughly 65% of the
high frequency variation in retail prices can be explained by observable customer characteristics such as
geographical location and past volume of purchases. The remaining 35% of the variation in retail prices
appearstobedue eithertohighfrequency ﬂuctuationsin wholesalepricesortosome sortof“informational
price discrimination” in the retail market. Using the limited number of days on which both wholesale and
retail prices are available, Chan (2001) ﬁnds that at most 50% of the variation in retail prices can be
explained by variations in the wholesale price of steel. This conclusion is possible due to the fact that on
many days there are multiple retail sales to different customers. These ﬁndings suggest that a large share
of the high frequency variation in retail prices can be ascribed to price discrimination, i.e. the ﬁrm charges
higher prices to more impatient or poorly informed retail customers (see Chan, Hall and Rust (2003) for a
more detailed analysis of bargaining, price setting, and price discrimination in the retail market for steel).
We conclude that even though retail sales occur much more frequently than wholesale purchases, the fact
that retail prices involve a number of other different considerations (including price discrimination based
on observable and unobservable characteristics of the customer) suggest that the retail price is at best a
very noisy and (upward) biased signal of the underlying wholesale price.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of inventories over the same period. Purchases of steel are easily recog-
nizable as the discontinuous upward jumps in the inventory trajectories. As is evident from the saw-tooth
pattern of the inventory holdings, the ﬁrm purchases the product much less frequently than it sells it. The
ﬁrm’s opportunistic purchasing behavior is very clear for this product. As can be seen in ﬁgures 1 and 2,
during the ﬁrst ten months of the sample, from July, 1997 until March, 1998, the ﬁrm held relatively low
levels of inventories at a time when the average price the ﬁrm paid for steel was about 20.5 cents per
pound. However as the Asian ﬁnancial crisis deepened, foreign steel producers began cutting their prices
and aggressively increasing their exports. We see this clearly in our data, where in April 1998, wholesale
prices dropped to 18.5 cents per pound. At that time the ﬁrm made a large purchase. As the price of
steel continued to fall to historical lows during the remainder of 1998 the ﬁrm made a succession of large
purchases that lead it to hold historically unprecedented high levels of inventories. We view this as clear
evidence that the ﬁrm is attempting to proﬁt from a “buy low, sell high” strategy.
92.2 The Model
Our model is an extension of previous work by Hall and Rust (2001), who showed that in a broad class of





rule from inventory theory. Their work can be viewed as linking contributions by Arrow et. al. (1951) and




￿ policies in inventory investment problems to more
recent work by Williams and Wright (1991), Deaton and Laroque (1992) and Miranda and Rui (1997) on




￿ thresholds derived by Scarf under the
assumption that the price (cost) of procuring (producing) inventories is constant are clearly suboptimal in
a speculative trading environment, since the stochastic ﬂuctuations in the price of steel affects the ﬁrm’s
perception of the optimal level of inventory S, and the threshold for purchasing new inventory s. Hall





where S and s are functions of certain underlying state variables including the wholesale price of steel p.3




￿ rule allows us to formulate and solve the problem of
endogenous sampling of steel wholesale prices, we describe the notation and key assumptions underlying









￿ rule constitutes the optimal strategy for
“buying low and selling high”. We assume that a middleman (which we also refer to as the “ﬁrm”) can
purchase unlimited quantities of steel at a time-varying wholesale price pt that evolves according to a
Markov transition density to be speciﬁed below. We assume that the middleman subsequently sells this
steel to retail customers at a retail price pr
t that includes a randomly varying markup over the current
wholesale price pt (if we think of the ﬁrm as selling to different customers on different business days, this
3This analysis extends previous results in the operations research literature such as Fabian et. al. (1959), Kingman
(1969), Kalymon (1971), Golabi (1985), Song and Zipkin (1993), Moinzadeh (1997), and Ozekici and Parlar (1999) that
prove the optimality of generalized versions of the
￿ S
￿ s
￿ rule when the cost (price) of producing (procuring) new inventory




￿ rule, they build on the OR literature by making the connection between models of optimal inventory policies and
models of storage and commodity prices. Moreover in the current paper we computationally solve and estimate our model.
Thus we can formally compare the model’s optimal policies to the inventory policies we see in the data. Besides the work
noted above, the most closely related recent work that we are aware of is the ambitious paper by Aguirregabiria (1999) that
models price and inventory decisions by a supermarket chain. A supermarket is similar to our steel wholesaler in that both
types of ﬁrms hold inventories of a substantial number of different products, purchasing them in the wholesale market and
selling their inventories at a markup to retail customers. The key difference is that prices in supermarkets are almost always
posted so there is no direct price discrimination and there is presumably a larger “menu cost” to changing prices on a day
by day basis. Aguirregabiria also did not directly address the endogenous sampling issue, using monthly price averages as
proxies for underlying daily prices. For this reason we are unable to directly employ his innovative and ambitious approach
to estimation.
10randomly varying markup is intended to be a “reduced-form” approach to capturing the pricing and price
discrimination decisions by the ﬁrm).
On each business day t the following sequence of actions occurs:
1. At the start of day t the ﬁrm knows its inventory level qt, the current wholesale price pt, and the






￿ the ﬁrm orders additional inventory qo








￿ the ﬁrm sets a retail price pr




















￿ the ﬁrm observes a realized retail demand for its steel, qr
t, modeled as a draw








￿ with a point mass at qr
t
￿ 0.











6. Sales on day t determine the level of inventories on hand at the beginning of business day t
￿ 1 via
























Note that we abstract from delivery lags and assume that the ﬁrm cannot backlog unﬁlled orders. Thus,
whenever demand exceeds quantity on hand, the residual unﬁlled demand is lost. Thus, in addition to the





￿ , we only observe a truncated measure of the ﬁrm’s retail
demand, i.e., we only observe the minimum of qr
t and qt
￿ qo
t as given in equation (3). Since the quantity
demanded has support on the
￿0
￿ ¥
￿ interval, equation (3) implies that there is always a positive probability

















Since retail sales occur much more frequently that purchases of new inventory, the retail sales price pr
t
provides an important source of information about the wholesale price pt. Presumably for most transac-
tions we should have pr
t
￿ pt, reﬂecting nonnegative markups over the current wholesale price of steel.
11However as noted above markups vary in an apparently random fashion from day to day, so at best pr
t is
a biased and noisy indicator of the wholesale price pt. In this version of the paper we bypass some of the
difﬁcult issues associated with modeling endogenous price setting and price discrimination by adopting a










￿ . This way of modeling prices is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to be consistent with
a variety of theories of bargaining and price discrimination by the ﬁrm.4





￿ is the conditional expectation of realized sales
revenue prqr given the current wholesale price p, quantity on hand q, and the observed information vari-
ables x. The ﬁrm’s retail sales on datet is a random draw qr









that depends on the retail price quote pr
t, the current wholesale price pt, and the values of the other ob-
















































where h is a continuous strictly positive probability density function over the interval
￿0
￿ ¥
￿ . Given this








































































In order to state the per period proﬁt function, we need to describe the costs that the ﬁrm incurs. The





assume that the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost K

















4Hall and Rust (2000) solved a version of the model in which the ﬁrm chooses both qo
t and pr
t. In this case, the value




￿ form. Solving this model takes considerably longer than the model presented here for two reasons. First,
the Hall and Rust (2000) model requires a two-dimensional optimization instead of an one-dimensional optimization at each
iteration of the Bellman equation. Second, in models with endogenous price setting, the generalized
￿ S
￿ s
￿ rule is not always




policies as we can when we solve the model presented here. This greatly increases the computational time required to solve
models that incorporate either endogenous (uniform) price setting (as in Hall and Rust 2000), or in models of bargaining and
price discrimination (as in Chan, Hall and Rust, 2003).





￿ . These costs include
physical storage costs, and “goodwill costs” representing the present value of lost future business from
customers whose orders cannot be ﬁlled due to a stockout. Goodwill costs can be viewed as the inverse of
the“convenienceyield”discussedinthecommoditystorageliterature(Kaldor, 1939, WilliamsandWright,
1991). In this case a convenience yield emerges from a desire to hold a buffer stock or precautionary level
of inventories in order to minimize goodwill costs from stockouts. This allows the model to capture
other reasons besides pure price speculation for holding inventories.5 The ﬁrm’s single-period proﬁts p














































￿ to maximize the










































￿ is given by the unique






















































































































































































5The ﬁrm obtains much of its steel from foreign sources. In the model orders occur instantaneously with certainty. In
practice, however, delivery lags can be several months and the steel delivered can often be of lower quality than agreed on.
The ﬁrm does have the option of refusing to take delivery if the steel is not of the quality promised. Having a buffer stock of
inventories on hand reduces the cost to ﬁrm of exercising this option. Also foreign producers of steel do from time to time


































































































































We invoke the inf operator in the deﬁnition of the optimal decision rule in equation (15) to handle the case





￿ as the smallest of the optimizing values of qo.
In this model the variables q and qo do not enter as separate arguments in the value function W given
in (12): rather they enter as the sum q
￿ qo as shown in equation (15). This symmetry property is a con-
sequence of our timing assumptions: since new orders of steel arrive instantaneously, the ﬁrm’s expected
sales, inventory holding costs, and expected discounted proﬁts only depend on the sum q
￿ qo, representing
inventory on hand at the beginning of the period after new orders qo have arrived. It follows that if the ﬁrm




















￿ . Another way to












If W were strictly concave in q, there would be a unique value of q
￿ qo that solves equation (16) for any




































In turns out that if K





￿ will not be strictly concave. However under fairly
14general conditions W is K-concave as a function of q for each ﬁxed p.6 Using the K-concavity property




























￿ q as discussed above. In particular Hall and Rust
(2001) proved:






￿ deﬁned in equation (12), whereW is deﬁned in terms of
the unique solution V to Bellman’s equation (11). Under appropriate regularity conditions given in Hall




























￿ is the desired or target































































































￿ rule in equation (18) into the deﬁnition of V in equation
(11) we obtain the following corollaries:

















































































Corollary 3: If ﬁxed costs of ordering is zero, K






























￿ is K-convex in its
second argument. More directly, W
￿ p
￿ q
￿ is K-concave in q iff
< K





5 , and for all z
= 0 and
b
= 0 such that q
@ z
A q and q
; b



























153 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
This section derives the likelihood function for the commodity price speculation problem presented above.
The problem is complicated by the existence of frequently binding inequality constraints on inventory
investment, qo. This implies that it is not possible to use standard Euler equation methods to estimate the
unknown parameters of the model via generalized method of moments. Note that Theorem 1 does yield
a ﬁrst order condition that could possibly provide a basis for a generalized methods of moments (GMM)















Ifwe assumethatthereisadditive measurementerroreinthewholesaleprice p, orassumethaterepresents
other unobserved (per unit) components of the cost of ordering new inventory, then it is tempting to treat
equation(23)asan“Eulerequation”anduseGMMtoestimateparametersofthemodel. However thereare
several big obstacles to this approach. First, we do not have a convenient analytical formula for the partial
derivativeofthevaluefunction, ¶W
( ¶q. Second, asweshowinTheorem2below, eveniftheunconditional




￿ for which it is optimal to purchase





￿ ), is generally nonzero. Finally, there is the issue of endogenous sampling, and
the fact that we observe purchases only an a relatively small subset of business days in our overall sample.
These problems motivate a search for an alternative likelihood-based approach that is capable of in-




￿ process. We show how to derive a non-degenerate likelihood function via the inclusion of
a single IID unobservable state variable et in the ﬁrm’s optimization problem. The resulting conditional
probability distribution function for qo has a mass point at qo
￿ 0 that reﬂects the frequently binding con-
straint that inventory investment cannot be negative. This conditional distribution allows us to derive a
full-information maximum likelihood estimator that provides a complete solution to the problem of en-
dogenous sampling of the whole price process. It does this by integrating out the unobserved values of
the wholesale prices in periods where they are unobserved. This likelihood is the analog of the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation for computing multi-step transition probabilities from a one-step transition prob-
abilities. We will discuss some of the drawbacks of this approach in order to motivate computationally
simpler but less efﬁcient simulated minimum distance estimator in section 4.
Some form of measurement error or unobserved state variable must be included as one of the state
variables x in the model presented in section 2. Without some sort of “error term” the model yields a de-













does not lie on its graph. To avoid the resulting “zero likelihood” problem, consider the case where there is
an unobserved component of the per unit cost of steel, denoted by et. We assume that the distribution of et
has support on the entire real line and continuous, strictly positive density f
￿
e
￿ . Theorem 2 below derives













Theorem 2: Let et be an (unobserved to the econometrician) component of the per unit cost of ordering
new inventory. Assume that
￿
et
￿ is an IID process whose density f is continuous and strictly positive over




￿ rule and the conditional

















































































































































































































The formula for the density of qo in equation (26) can be derived by differentiating the conditional distri-











































































































































































￿ . The gap is problematic for maximum likelihood estimation since a single observation with
an order smaller than the predicted minimum order size would result in a zero value for the likelihood
function. To obtain a fully nondegenerate likelihood function, we would have to introduce a second unob-
servable, such as an unobservable component u of the ﬁxed cost K of placing an order. If the distribution
of this component is such that there is positive probability that the combined order cost K
￿ u is arbitrarily
close to zero for sufﬁciently small realizations of u, then consistent with Corollary 3 of section 2, the gap
will be zero, thus eliminating the possibility of a “zero likelihood problem.” In practice for the values of K
we encountered in our estimation, the gap is sufﬁciently small that zero likelihood problems did not arise.
Therefore in order to simplify the the model and the exposition we decided to omit the case where there
are unobservable components of K as well as p.










￿ be denoted by µ. From
our discussion of the model in section 2, it is easy to see the µ is a mixed discrete/continuous density with
three classes of outcomes for qt






























￿ the ﬁrm will have a stockout and
qt
￿ 1
￿ 0; 3) otherwise qt










































￿ . We summarize this as:














































































￿ evolve as a joint Markov process
which also has a discrete/continuous transition probability density l. We state this as Theorem 4:



























































































￿ are observed over the











Deﬁnition 1: The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator ˆ q
f


































































































￿ and the ﬁrm’s discount factor r. Let Q
denote a compact parameter space.














￿ at which purchases occur. To simplify notation we assume (without loss of
generality) that the data begin on the day of the ﬁrst observed purchase, so t1
￿ 0, and end on the day of
the last observed purchase, tn
￿ T. The relevant likelihood in this case is a marginal likelihood lp formed
by integrating the full likelihood function l f in equation (33) over wholesale prices pt for all time indices
t in the complement of Tn. For simplicity, we will consider the case where retail sales are observed in
every period. Otherwise, an additional set of integrations would need to be performed over the values
of pr
t for business days t where no retail sales occurred. As noted in the Introduction, it is notationally
convenient to convert the endogenous sampling problem into a censored sampling problem by deﬁning an
observed censored price sequence
￿
pt














Deﬁnition 2: The Partial Information Maximum Likelihood (PIML) estimator ˆ q
p
























































































Thus, the PIML likelihood lp is derived from the FIML likelihood l f by integrating out the unobserved
wholesale prices over the dates t
(
2 Tn that purchases do not occur. The region of integration is limited










￿ . Notice that this region involves the unobserved state variable et. Thus the




￿ over all of the T
￿ n dates t
(
2 Tn at which
purchases do not occur.
We will now sketch the asymptotic properties of the PIML estimator under the assumption that there
is only one ﬁrm, but T
R ¥. The asymptotic properties of the FIML estimator are well known: the
logarithm of lf can be approximated as a (normalized) sum of random variables. Despite the correlation
in these random variables in successive time periods, standard limit theorems for ergodic processes can be
used to show that this normalized sum converges to a well deﬁned score function. A standard “information
inequality” argument can then be used to show that this score function is maximized at the true parameter
value q
P , assuming that the model is correctly speciﬁed. A formal proof would require speciﬁcation of
regularity conditions similar to Billingsley (1961) and White (1982) to ensure that the convergence of
these normalized sums to the score function is uniform and that the score function is uniquely maximized
at q
P . These are standard sufﬁcient conditions for the consistency of maximum likelihood.
However the argument for the consistency of the PIML estimator is more complicated. The high-
dimensionalintegrationsovertheirregularlyspacedintervalsbetweensuccessivepurchasescreatelinkages
between the observations in the PIML estimator. When we take the logarithm of the likelihood it no
longer decomposes into a normalized sum of T random variables as in the FIML case. Thus the standard
arguments used to prove the consistency and asymptotic normality in the FIML case do not appear to apply
20in the PIML case. At best, the logarithm of the PIML likelihood decomposes into a sum of n terms, where
each term is the logarithm of a high dimensional integral of the transition probability density l over the









￿ is ergodic, we should
have n
R ¥ with probability1 as T
R ¥. Our strategy will be to do theasymptotics forthe PIML estimator
as a function of the number of purchases n rather than as a function of the number of time periods T over
which the ﬁrm is observed. In order to derive the asymptotic properties of the PIML estimator, we will
use the fact that the state of the process at successive purchase dates is an embedded Markov chain and the
sequence of realized states between successive purchases forms a segmented Markov chain. We will then
argue that the segmented Markov chain is ergodic, which will allow us to apply the relevant limit theorems











































































￿ denote the embedded process associated with
￿
xt
￿ and G. This is the discrete time












We derive the transition density n for the embedded process
￿
zi
￿ as a ti
￿ ti
& 1-step transition density for
successive visits to the purchase set G.
Lemma 1: The embedded process
￿
zi































































￿ be the segmented process associated with
￿
xt
￿ , i.e. the process for which wi is
deﬁned as the realized (observed) values of
￿
xt
￿ for the sequence of ti
￿ ti
& 1 time periods following the
purchase at ti


















21Notice that the number of components in the segment wi is a random variable, equal to the difference
ti
￿ ti
& 1, in the successive times that
￿
xt
￿ visits the purchase set G.
Lemma 2: The segmented process
￿
wi






























































Thus, the transition density for the segmented chain
￿
wi

































￿ 1 when purchases are
















￿ band, so that it is not optimal to purchase during this time interval.
Notice that due to the Markov property for
￿
xt
￿ , only the last element of the segment wi
& 1, xti
G 1, is















￿ . Let t
￿ ti
￿ 1
￿ ti, be the










will visit G inﬁnitely often and the number of visits n observed over any horizon T tends to inﬁnity with
probability 1 as T
R ¥.
Assumption 1: The Markov chain
￿
xt
￿ is ergodic (i.e. it possesses a unique stationary distribution), the












are ergodic Markov chains.
To study the asymptotic properties of the PIML estimator, it is useful to rewrite the likelihood function
lp as a product of n



























































￿ ¥, the process
￿
xt
￿ visits G inﬁnitely often and n
R ¥ with probability 1 as
T
R ¥. Therefore we will carry out the asymptotic analysis indexing the sample size by the number of
22purchases n rather than the total number of time periods that the process is observed, T. To establish
consistency of the PIML estimator, it is convenient to work with the normalized log-likelihood functions.
































































































Taking logs and dividing by n












































































































































































Thus, r is the conditional density of the segment wi
￿ 1 given the previous segment wi, and given that the
length of segment wi
￿ 1 is ti
￿ 1
￿ ti, i.e. the duration between purchases at times ti and ti
￿ 1. Comparing



































￿ 1 implicitly contains the information on ti
￿ 1
￿ ti since this duration is also proportional to
the length of wi
￿ 1 as we can see in Deﬁnition 5. Thus, since the realized value of the duration between
successive purchasesti
￿ 1




to emphasize that the normalized log-likelihood function can be written as a normalized sum of random
variables that depend on the realizations of an ergodic segmented Markov chain
￿
wi
￿ . Under suitable
regularity conditions on the moments of the functions v j, j
￿ 1
￿ 2, Assumption 1 and the Ergodic Theorem
23for Markov processes imply that as n

















































































is the invariant distribution for the segmented chain
￿
wi
￿ . Using the alternative representation of lp in
equation (47), we are now able to verify the consistency of the PIML estimator. Note that as n
R ¥, the





































































































Note that for any w and t, the Information Inequality guarantees that the expression in brackets in (54) is
maximized at q
￿ q















































will also be maximized at q
￿ q
P . This implies that the limiting expected log likelihood is maximized at
q





We conclude this section with a brief sketch the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the PIML
estimator. If model is correctly speciﬁed and appropriate regularity conditions hold, the ﬁrst order con-
ditions for ˆ qp can be expanded in Taylor series about the true parameter q
P . Applying a Central Limit














































































Further it is not difﬁcult to show that the difference between the information matrices for the FIML and
PIMLestimatorsisa positive semi-deﬁnitivematrix. Thisimplies thatthereisindeedalossofinformation,
and therefore an increase in variance, caused by the endogenous sampling problem. However as long as
our model is correctly speciﬁed, the PIML estimator will be consistent. If the model is misspeciﬁed, then a
modiﬁcation of arguments in White (1982) can be used to show that the PIML and FIML still converge and
have an asymptoticallynormal distribution, but they converge to a value of q
P that minimizes the Kullbeck-
Liebler distance between the parametric model and the true data generating process. The formulas for the
asymptotic variance of the estimators must be changed to the outer product of the information and the
inverse Hessians of the log likelihood when the model is misspeciﬁed, since in that case the covariance of
ˆ qn is no longer given by the inverse of the information matrix, see White (1982).
The drawback of the PIML estimator is that it is computationally intensive due to the high dimensional
integrations that are required to evaluate lp. Since no purchases of steel are observed on the majority of
business days in our sample, the mean time between purchases is about 10 business days, so that on av-
erage 10 dimensional integrals must be calculated for each term entering the likelihood. Although there
have been important advances in simulation estimation and low discrepancy methods for computing high
dimensional integrals (see, e.g. Rust, Traub and Wo´ zniakowski, 2002), the PIML will still be a fairly
computationally burdensome estimator. A second drawback is that if our interest is primarily on making




￿ , the other structural parameters that must be estimated to
adjust for the endogeneity of the sampling process amount to nuisance parameters. Errors in the speciﬁ-
cation of the ﬁrm’s optimal investment and speculation problem will result in inconsistent estimates of the









It is possible to consider the use of ﬂexible reduced-form speciﬁcations for the densities entering the
overall decomposition of the transition density l given in Theorem 4. However without some strong prior












￿ model combined with the observations of retail transaction prices provides strong
identifying restrictions, limiting how far the wholesale price process
￿
pt
￿ can drift away from observed





￿ model predicts that the number of orders should be increasing and decreasing in a
corresponding fashion. Given the observed sequence of purchases, this property enables us to separately












￿ model. However if a non-
parametric model does not impose any sort of proﬁt maximizing or loss minimizing behavioral motivation
on the part of the ﬁrm, then the wholesale market price
￿
pt





￿ without there being any strong effect on the likelihood of the observed sequences of purchases.









￿ and the trading rule used by the ﬁrm when we only have access to endogenously sampled
data.
4 Simulated Minimum Distance Estimation
This section introduces a simulated minimum distance estimator (SMD) that may be less efﬁcient than
the PIML estimator, but which does not require the high dimensional integration and is much easier to
compute. Similar estimators have been proposed in other contexts by Lee and Ingram (1991) and Dufﬁe
and Singleton (1993). The idea behind the SMD estimator is quite straightforward, and is similar in spirit
to the method of “calibration”. The main difference is that the SMD estimator is based on an explicit sta-
tistical criterion function that enables us to compute asymptotic distributions for the parameter estimator,
evaluate the ﬁt of alternative speciﬁcations, and to conduct goodness of ﬁt tests.
The SMD estimator is simply the parameter value that minimizes the distance between a set of simu-
lated and sample moments using the observed censored observations. First we calculate sample moments
using the censored observations in the data, i.e. with pt
￿ 0 when qo
t
￿ 0. Then we generate one or more




￿ model for a given trial value q of the unknown parameter vector. We
deﬁne ˆ qsmd as the value of q that minimizes a quadratic form in the difference between the sample mo-
ments for the actual data and the sample moments of the simulated data, where the simulated data has been
censored in exactly the same fashion as the actual data, i.e. we set pt
￿ 0 whenever the simulated value of
qo
t
￿ 0. Thus even though various moments based on censored data may be biased, inconsistent estimators
26of the corresponding moments of the ergodic process in the absence of censoring, this does not prevent us
from deriving a consistent SMD estimator for q
P . In fact we show that the SMD estimator is consistent










￿ where S is the
number of simulations. Consequently, there is an efﬁciency gain to running additional simulations since it
reduces the variance of the estimator. However the “penalty” to forming an SMD estimator based on only
a single realization appears relatively small: the asymptotic variance is only twice as large as the variance
of an estimator that eliminates all simulation noise by letting S
R ¥. This increase in variance seems small
in comparison to the substantial reduction in computational burden from using only a single simulation





and a re-simulation of the model using a ﬁxed set of random shocks (see below) each time the parameter
q is updated, so the SMD estimator is still fairly computationally demanding. Its other drawback is that
it requires the analyst to determine an appropriate set of moments to represent the relevant metric for
assessing the distance between the predictions of the model and the data. In principle an inﬁnite number




￿ denote the censored process introduced in section 3 (i.e. with pt
￿ 0 when qo
t
￿ 0), and let q
denote the L
N 1 vector of parameters to be estimated. The SMD estimator is based on ﬁnding a parameter
value that best ﬁts a J






















￿ that determines the moments we wish to
match. We include xt and its lag xt
& 1 as arguments of h in order to handle situations were we are trying to
ﬁt moments suchas means and covariances of thecomponentsof xt. Itisstraightforwardto allow moments
that involve more than one lag: we only include a single lagged value of xt in our presentation below for
notational simplicity.
By Assumption 1, the process
￿
xt





















R ¥). Under suitable additional regularity conditions, a central limit theorem



























































Now assume itispossible to generate simulated realizations of the
￿
xt
￿ process forany candidate value
of q, and that this process is censored in exactly the same way as the observed
￿
xt
￿ process is censored,
i.e., with pt
￿ 0 when qo
t
￿ 0. These simulations depend on a T





variables that are drawn once at the start of the estimation process and held ﬁxed thereafter in order for the
estimator to satisfy stochastic equicontinuity conditions necessary to establish asymptotic normality of the








































reﬂects the fact that the simulated process is adapted to the realization of the
￿
ut












￿ depend only on the ﬁrst t realized values of
￿
us
￿ and not on subsequent
realized values of us for s
￿ t. Note that we allow the simulated process to depend on the ﬁrst value x0 of
the observed data as an initializing condition.
To show that it is possible to construct such smooth simulators, consider the unidimensional case
where xt












￿ be the corresponding
conditional CDF. The ﬁrst value of the simulated process is simply set to the observed value x0. Using the































￿ is a continuously























































￿ is a continuously differentiable function of x and q.
In the case where
￿
xt










￿ , we can do a similar











































will be smooth function of q just as in the univariate case, except that in the two-dimensional case we need











￿ for each time period simulated. For example to






































￿ and will be a smooth function of q















































￿ and will be smooth functions of q provided






























































































￿ denote S IID T




￿ random vectors used to generate the























































































29whereWT is a J
N J positive deﬁnite weighting matrix.
In order to simplify the asymptotic analysis, we initially assume that we have a correct parametric
speciﬁcation of the endogenous sampling problem. That is we make
























P , thesimulated sequenceinitializedfromtheobserved valuex0 hasthesameprobability




We believe that it is possible to relax assumption 2 to allow the parametric model to be misspeciﬁed,
following an analysis similar to that of Hall and Inoue (2002) who characterized the asymptotic properties
of the GMM estimator in the misspeciﬁed case. We conjecture that their analysis will also apply to the
case of SMD estimation and that the asymptotic properties of the SMD estimator that we derive for the
correctly speciﬁed case will still hold, except that now q
P is interpreted as the value of q the minimizes the
distance between the moments of the true data generating process and the parametric simulated process,
where the expectation is taken in the limit as both S
R ¥ and T
R ¥.7
We now sketch the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the SMD estimator, listing the key
assumptions and showing how its asymptotic variance depends on the number of simulations S.
Assumption 3: For any q






































































































P is identiﬁed; that is, if q
a
￿ q

























￿ L and limT
Y ¥WT
￿ W with probability 1 whereW is a J
N J positive deﬁnite matrix.
7When there is misspeciﬁcation, the standard formula for the asymptotic covariance matrix when the model is correctly
speciﬁed will generally not be consistent when the model is misspeciﬁed. However similar to the case of maximum likeli-
hood estimation of misspeciﬁed models (White, 1982), there are alternative estimators of the asymptotic covariance matrix
that are consistent when the model is misspeciﬁed.
30The consistency of the SMD estimator can be established by providing appropriate regularity con-






















































































and this combined with the uniform consistency result implies the consistency of ˆ qT. The asymptotic








































where ˜ qT denotes a vector that is (elementwise) on the line segment between ˆ qT and q
P . Substituting (74)










































￿ is invertible, which will be the case with probability 1
for sufﬁciently large T due to assumptions 3 and 4. Now multiply both sides of equation (75) by
]
T and


























































which by assumption 2 has the same distribution as
￿
xt
















￿ , has the same probability distribution as hT and are distributed independently of hT. The





























































































































































































































































& 1 results in an SMD estimator with minimal variance. In this case the asymptotic distri-
bution of ˆ qT simpliﬁes to:
Theorem 5: Consider the SMD estimator ˆ qT formed using a weighting matrix WT equal to the inverse of
















































The most important point to note about this result is that the penalty to forming an SMD estimator using
only a single realization S












￿ is fairly small.









￿ exactly, such as would be done via Monte Carlo integration when S
R ¥.

































































































￿ is recomputed each time the parameter q is
updated.
More efﬁcient estimators can be obtained by selecting “efﬁcient moment functions” h such as the score
of the partial information maximum likelihood function derived in section 3. Such an estimator can attain
the Cramer-Rao efﬁciency bound derived for the PIML estimator in equation (56). However the score
involves a ratio of integrals, and it is not clear that these integrals can be replaced by simulation estimates
and still obtain a consistent SMD estimator. If accurate numerical integrals are required, the computational
advantage of the SMD estimator is lost and it may be less computationally burdensome to compute the
PIML estimator directly. This is a topic for future work. We note that the deﬁnition of the SMD estimator
can be extended to allow moments formed from the segmented Markov chain
￿
wi
￿ deﬁned in section 3.
This formulation would be required in the case where h is the score of the partial information likelihood
function, since the components of the score involve the segmented chain as shown in section 3. Using
moments from the segmented chain involves some minor modiﬁcations of the arguments given above. We
now do the asymptotics as a function of the number of purchases n rather than the total number of time












































￿ S to construct S IID realizations of the segmented process.
Finally, we note that it is appears that it is possible to relax assumption 2 that the parametric model
is correctly speciﬁed. As long as assumptions 3 and 4 hold, there will still exist well deﬁned limiting




￿ , for each q
2 Q. Deﬁne q
P as the value that minimizes the































￿ denotes the limit of hT as T
R ¥ for the true data generating process. If the value of q
P that




























￿ denotes the long run or ergodic expectation of h with respect to the true data generating
process. This implies that as t
















































N J covariancematrixL2. Howeverinthemisspeciﬁedcase, L2 maynotequalthesameformula





























Following a Taylor expansion argument just as in the correctly speciﬁed case above, we should be able to




































































The main outstanding issue is to actually establish the limiting asymptotic distribution that is conjectured
in (96) and relate the asymptotic covariance matrix L3 to the asymptotic covariance matrix L2 in (93).
As we noted above, we believe that results of Hall and Inoue (2002) on GMM estimation of misspeciﬁed
models can be adapted to establish the asymptotic distribution of the SMD estimator in the misspeciﬁed
case. However given the space constraints we leave this topic, together with Monte Carlo tests and an
empirical application of the SMD estimator for a misspeciﬁed model, as a topic for subsequent research.
5 Empirical Application
To illustrate the simulated minimum distance estimator, we consider a special case of the model in which











￿ . We ﬁrst estimate the model using data generated from the model itself.
In this case, we know the model is correctly speciﬁed, and we know the true parameter vector. Second,
we estimate the model twice using actual data for two products from the steel service center. Finally,
we decompose the ﬁrm’s proﬁts by product into four components. We use this decomposition to infer
the share of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts that are due to markups paid by retail customers and the share due to price
speculation. We also use this decomposition to compare the general manager’s purchasing decisions to the
model’s trading rules.
5.1 A special case of the model
























































As before, the manager takes the wholesale price pt and quantity demanded qr
t as given. The manager
knows pt before deciding qo
t . The manager then draws qr









￿ , are described in section 2. The holding cost function is quadratic so the marginal
convenience yield is decreasing in the level of inventories.

























￿ sequence. If we let ¯ µp and ¯ sp denote the uncensored mean and standard









































The ﬁrm draws a quantity demanded qr
t each period from a mixed truncated lognormal distribution condi-
tional on pt That is, with probability h, qd
t
￿ 0, and with probability 1
￿ h, qd
t is drawn from a truncated








￿ . Both V, the price elasticity of demand,
and h are ﬁxed, time-invariant constants.
Let ¯ µq and ¯ sq denote the unconditional mean and standard deviation of the quantity demanded distri-





















Then the mean and standard deviation of quantity demanded conditioned on pt and a sales occurring, µq











































The SMD estimation procedure requires us to solve for the optimal inventory investment rule each time
we evaluate the criterion for a new parameter vector. We solve the model by the method of parameter-




































































































































36As the name suggests, PPI employs an iterative strategy to ﬁnd the N coefﬁcients on the basis functions
that solve the system of equations in (103). Given an initial guess of the coefﬁcient vector, J, we solve the




























￿ matrices, P and EP, with elements Pm
H n and
EPm





























































￿ . Then the system of equations (103) can written
in matrix form as y
￿ XJ. If M
￿ N and X is invertible, the solution for J is simply ˆ J
￿ y
( X. If M
￿ N,







- y. Using ˆ J
as our updated coefﬁcient vector, we iterate on this procedure until the coefﬁcient vector converges to a
ﬁxed point.
We approximated the value function by a complete set of Chebychev polynomials of degree 3 in
p and q (so N




￿ pairs choosing 15 discrete values
for p and 15 discrete values for q. The grid points are ﬁxed at the Chebychev zeros, so they are more
heavily weighted toward the boundaries of the state space. This parameterization of the value function
does not guarantee concavity of the value function; nevertheless, for the problem at hand we found PPI
to be relatively accurate, robust, and fast compared to alternative solution methods. See Benitez-Silva,
Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2001) for detailed comparisons of the PPI algorithm with other solution
techniques for a variety of different models.
5.3 Estimation
We have considerable freedom in our choice of moments functions, the h vector, to use in the criterion. As
discussed above, the most efﬁcient moment functions we could use would be the score of the partial infor-
mation maximum likelihood function derived in section 3. However given the difﬁculties in computing the
37high dimensional integrals involved in evaluating the score, we instead match the means and histograms
(four of the ﬁve quintile bins) of the p, pr, qo, qs, and q processes for a total of 25 moment conditions. We
set the number of simulations, S, to 10.
Computing histogram bins requires the use of indicator functions. However indicator functions would





























￿ for a smallpositive
number s. The resultingestimation criterionis asmooth function of theparameters, asdiscussed in section
4. However, in or simulations we did not allow for unobserved IID components et to the wholesale order
price pt as described in section 3. Without the smoothing provided by the e’s, the estimation criterion is




is a continuously differentiable function of q, small shifts in s
￿
p
￿ can have a discontinuous impact on













fact, we did ﬁnd regions in the parameter space in which concentrated “slices” of the criterion function














￿ only at high prices where S
￿
p
￿ is very close to s
￿
p
￿ and thus the potential discontinuity caused
by shifts in s
￿
p
￿ is small. With the additional help from the averaging that occurs in formulating the
simulated moments, we observed that the estimation criterion appeared to be smooth for most parameter
values. To guard against possible discontinuities or local minima, we employed MATLAB’s constrained
minimization routine fmincon.m, and we visually inspected concentrated slices of the criterion function
after each estimation. However we acknowledge that even though plots of the objective appear to be
smooth, there may be “microscopic” discontinuities in the slopes in the criterion that may be responsible
for unusually small estimated standard errors that we discuss below.





￿ is the variance-covariance of the residuals from the simulation sequence. However if the
model is correctly speciﬁed, then when q
￿ q
P , the simulated sequence will have the probability distribu-
tion as the observed sequence; therefore we use inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals








where ht is the sample mean given in formula (57). Since this weighting matrix is just a function of the
sample moments, it remains ﬁxed throughout the estimation.
38Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
parameter truth point standard point standard point standard
estimate error estimate error estimate error
K 100 108.6 11.6 138.7 16.5 87.4 10.5
a0 1.50 1.46 0.66 1.80 0.47 1.45 0.45
a1 1.15 1.13 0.04 1.11 0.03 1.20 0.03
lp 0.990 0.991 0.0003 0.989 0.0007 0.990 0.0003
¯ µp 19.50 20.06 0.60 20.10 0.49 19.78 0.55
¯ sp 5.60 6.39 0.29 6.18 0.27 5.33 0.30
¯ µq 150.0 137.1 6.5 157.1 4.7 130.3 3.6
¯ sq 300.0 363.5 25.2 270.3 12.1 250.5 11.4
V 1.50 1.31 0.17 1.41 0.17 1.62 0.21
f -2.5 -2.69 1.36 -1.87 1.37 -2.67 1.01
r 0.075/365 0.075/365 0.075/365 0.075/365




￿ 381 187 217
Table 1: Estimation results on data generated by the model.
Two parameters were ﬁxed prior to estimation. The daily interest rate, r, was set to 0.075/365, and the fraction of days in which












In our initial exercise, there are two sets of simulations: ﬁrst, we ﬁxed the parameter values in the
model to those in second column of table 1; we solved the model and created three simulated data sets
of 1191 periods from the model; second using these simulated data sets, we estimated the model using
our simulated minimum distance estimator. The point estimates and standard errors for each of the ten
parameters are reported in table 1. Prior to estimation, we set the interest rate equal to its’ true value and
h equal to the fraction of days in which no sale occurred.
The quantity data are in hundred-weight (i.e. in 100’s of pounds) so the price parameters are in dollars-
per-hundredweight (or cents per pound). The ﬁxed cost, K, is set to $100 per order. The parameter choices
for ¯ µp and ¯ sp imply the uncensored price process has a mean of $17.60 per hundred-weight or 17.6 cents
per pound and a standard deviation of $3.70 dollars per hundred-weight. The parameter values of ¯ µq, ¯ sq
and V imply the average sale is 107 hundred-weight or 1,070 pounds. The interest rate r is set to 7.5 percent
per annum. The storage cost net of convenience yield, f is set -2.75 dollars per squared hundred-weight,
so the convenience yield dominates the storage cost.
Formostoftheparameters, thepointestimatesseemreasonablyclosetotheirtruevalues. Forexample,
all three of the point estimates of the AR(1) coefﬁcient of the wholesale price process, l p, are within
two-tenths of one percent of the true value. All three point estimates of the ﬁxed cost, K, are sensible
39particularly given the difﬁculty in estimating K. The ﬁxed cost of ordering largely determines the distance
between the S and s bands and thus the minimum order size. To accurately identify this ﬁxed cost requires
numerous observations of days in which the ﬁrm is holding inventory levels close to s particularly at low
prices. Given the relatively few days the ﬁrm purchases, particular at low prices, there are very few days
the ﬁrm holds inventories close to s.
While we feel the SMD estimator delivers sensible point estimates, only two-thirds of the point es-
timates are within two standard errors of the true values. Several of the numerical standard errors seem
implausibly small, particularly given the variation in the three point estimates. For example, the standard
deviations of the three point estimates for K and lp are considerably larger than their estimated standard
errors. Moreover, the estimation procedure provides a formal criterion of the validity of model. Since the
number of moment conditions exceeds the number of parameters estimated (J
￿ L) the model is overiden-

































In bottom row of table 1 we report the value of this c2 statistic for each of three estimates. In each case,
the model is decisively rejected. The small standard errors and the large Chi-squared statistics may be due
to small discontinuities in the estimation criterion, a result of our failure to account for unobservable com-
ponents et of order prices pt. These results suggest that although the consistency of the SMD estimator is
not jeopardized by small discontinuities, the estimated covariance matrix and standard errors may be much
more sensitive to small discontinuities in the simulated moments. In future work we plan to investigate
how discontinuities could affect the asymptotic properties of the SMD estimator, but this investigation is
beyond the scope of this paper. Our results suggest that in the absence of an asymptotic theory that ac-
counts for discontinuities in the estimation criterion, it may be important to include unobservables such as
et in the simulations in order to smooth out these discontinuities in order to obtain consistent estimates of
the asymptotic covariance matrix.
We now estimate the model for two products independently. In table 2 we report the point estimates
and standard errors for the parameters of the model for products we call product 2 and 4. As before, the
interest rate r, and h are ﬁxed prior to estimation: r is set to 0.075/365. We did not attempt to estimate the
parameter h along with the other parameters. Instead we used an initial consistent estimator of h equal the
fraction of days no sale occurred. The general manager would not provide us speciﬁc data on the ﬁrm’s
borrowing and lending (many sales involve trade credit), but told us that one and three-quarter points over
40Product 2 Product 4
parameter point standard point standard
estimate error estimate error
K 39.2 6.1 59.6 6.9
a0 1.33 0.98 0.99 1.10
a1 0.98 0.04 1.10 0.05
lp 0.992 0.0006 0.984 0.003
¯ µp 24.40 0.66 18.55 0.60
¯ sp 7.98 0.25 4.83 0.41
¯ µq 215.2 7.7 301.8 6.9
¯ sq 747.6 41.8 496.5 31.1
V 1.48 0.20 0.92 0.15







Table 2: Estimation Results using data for product 2 and product 4.
Two parameters were ﬁxed prior to estimation. For both products, the daily interest rate, r, was set to 0.075/365; for each product












a short-term LIBOR rate was a good estimate of the interest rate they faced. The average 3-month LIBOR
rate over the period studied is about 5.75, which implies an average annual borrowing rate for the ﬁrm of
about 7.5%.
Although we estimated the parameters for each of these products independently, it is reassuring that
several of the point estimates are similar across the two products. It is reasonable to expect that the
parameters, K, a0, a1, lp, V, and f to be quite similar, if not identical, across products.8 In general this is
case. After we estimated the models, we asked the general manager what he estimated the ﬁxed costs of
placing an order to be (this ﬁxed cost corresponds to the parameter K in our model). His estimate was $50
– the midpoint of our two estimates. The main ﬁxed cost to ordering is the value of the general manager
and his administrative assistant’s time in takes to complete the paperwork.
The marginal cost of storage parameter, f, is negative for both products so the marginal convenience
yield dominates the physical costs of storage. This result is consistent with the observation in the commod-
ity storage literature that negative storage costs are a key determinate of the autocorrelation in commodity
prices. We experimented with various function forms for the holding cost function and stock-out penalty
functions. If the marginal value of holding inventories is small when inventories are close to zero (i.e.
8We could have estimated the model jointly across the two products, constraining these value to be equal across products.








Simulated Realizations of States Variables, p and q








































Figure 3: Scatterplot of purchase price and inventory holding pairs from a simulation for product 4. The






￿ bands from the model.
when the wholesale price is high), the optimal strategy is for the ﬁrm to effectively shut down by holding
no inventories until the wholesale price falls. In other words, the s
￿
p
￿ band equals zero for p greater than
some threshold. While we do observe near-zero levels inventories in the data from time to time, these near
stockout levels do not persist for more than a few days. If the marginal value of holding inventories is “too
large” even when the ﬁrm is holding large levels of inventories, the model implies the ﬁrm should (coun-
terfactually) always hold inventories near its capacity constraint. Hence we found having some convexity
in the holding cost helpful in matching mean and spread of inventories holdings we see in the data.







￿ bands derived from the optimal decisions rules for the manager’s problem using the estimated
parameter vector for product 4. Due to the ﬁxed costs of ordering, the S
￿
p




band although the difference between the two bands decreases as the price increases. In other words, the
minimum order size is a decreasing function of the price. In ﬁgure 3 we also scatterplot a set of simulated
state space pairs (pt





￿ pair is below the s
￿
p
￿ band (in the southwest corner of the graph). In the simulation presented,


























































Figure 4: Simulated inventory data from the estimated














































Figure 5: Censored (solid line) and uncensored (dot-
ted line) purchase prices, pt from a simulation for
product 4.
In table 2 we also report the minimized SMD estimation criterion. Although both models are for-
mally rejected, the models at the estimated parameter values capture several of the salient features of the
inventory and price data. facts of inventory investment behavior that we observe in our data (for further
discussion, see Hall and Rust, 1999). Figures 3, 4, 5 highlight some of the strengths of the model. First, in
the data purchases are made infrequently. Figure 5 presents the censored and uncensored purchase price
series, pt. The solid line is the analog of what we observe in the data: we linearly interpolated between
the prices at which transactions took place; the dotted line includes the unobserved prices at which no
transactions occurred. During periods of low prices (e.g. days 100-200, 350-400 and 750-800) the ﬁrm
aggressively made purchases to build up large levels of inventories. The large levels of inventories were
slowly drawn down as prices inevitably rose. Note there were only four purchases made between business
days 200 and 320. Thus after exploiting a low price opportunity, the ﬁrm may subsequently make no new
purchases for many days. Second, we observe both small and large purchases in the data. Again this can




￿ pair (dot) is below the s
￿
p
￿ band, the size of the order is
the vertical distance between the S
￿
p




￿ pair (dot). When the purchase price is less than
16 cent per pound, we observe both large and small orders. When the purchase price is above 18 cents per
pound we only observe small orders. In ﬁgure 5, the size of the marker is proportional to the size of the
purchase. Again once can see that the model predicts relatively large purchases when the price is low and
relatively small purchases when the price is high. Third, in the data we observe periods of with high levels
of inventories and periods with low levels of inventories. From the scatterplot in ﬁgure 3 and the time path
43of inventories plotted in ﬁgure 4 we can see that the model predicts that inventory levels will vary over the
sample between almost zero and 2.0 million pounds.
The main shortcoming of the estimation is our inability to match the downward trend of the price
process that we see in almost all of the ﬁrm’s products. As illustrated in 2 the wholesale price for product
4 fell from 20 cents per pound in 1997 to about 12 cents per pound in 2002. No such trend is evident in
simulations such as the one presented in ﬁgures 4 and 5. In our model, prices are stationary though highly




￿ bands plotted in ﬁgure 3 the optimal decision rules
imply counterfactually that the ﬁrm should make only small purchases and hold low levels of inventories
whenever the procurement price is above 17 cents per pound. From ﬁgures 1 and 2 we see that, for product
4, the ﬁrm made large purchases around 18.5 cents per pound in April 1998, and around 15 dollars per
hundred-weight in the later part of the sample.
An often suggested solution to this trend problem is that we assume that the log of steel prices follow
a random walk. For product 4, if we concentrate out all the other parameters except lp, the criterion
surface is a steeply sloped and smooth cup centered around 0.984 so the small standard error associated
with the AR(1) coefﬁcient is not surprising. But the concentrated criterion surface actually turns down
slightly between .995 and 1.01. (The model still solves numerically for values of lp slightly greater than
one.) The global minimum is still located at 0.984, but there appears to be a local minimum just above
1.00. However if we assume the log price process follows a (truncated) random walk, the optimal decision
rules implies frequent small- to medium-size orders such that the inventory level ﬂuctuates closely around
a ﬁxed target level. A version of the model which assumes log
￿
pt
￿ follows a random walk will not imply
the large variation in inventory holdings that we see in the data. A second potential solution is to detrend
the data. However when we ﬁrst started working on this project, no one we talked to expected steel price
to decline 40% in four years. To some extent we are just working with too short a sample period. A third
candidate solution is to add an additional macroeconomic state variable. Such a variable could allow for
“high price” regimes and “low price” regimes. As we discuss below, we view this third solution as the
most promising.
5.4 A proﬁt decomposition exercise
Finally, we use simulationsof the estimated model todeducethe relative importance of capital gainsversus
markups for the overall proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. By substituting the law of motion for inventories (4) into


































































The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (105) can be interpreted as the discounted present value of
the markup paid by the ﬁrm’s retail customers over the current wholesale price while the third term can be
interpreted as the discounted present value of the capital gains or loss from holding the steel from period
t
￿ 1 into period t. The fourth, and ﬁfth terms are the discounted present values of the order costs and the
holding costs incurred by the ﬁrm over the sample period.
Sincethisdecompositiondependsonthewholesalepricepathbetweenpurchases, wesimulatebetween
purchase dates via importance sampling. That is, for each interval between successive purchase dates, we
simulate wholesale price paths that are consistent with the estimated law of motion (98) and the observed
purchase prices at the beginning and end of the interval. Since our theory implies that the ﬁrm places an
order anytime the quantity falls below the order threshold, s
￿
p
￿ , we truncate the simulated price process by




￿ for any draw within the simulated paths. We discuss our simulation
method in more detail in the appendix.
Weﬁrstemploythisdecompositiontoevaluatethegeneralmanager’sactualperformanceoverthefour-
and-a-half year sample period for products 2 and 4. For a given interpolated price series, we decomposed
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts using the actual data for qt, qs
t, and qo
t , our ﬁxed value for the interest rate, r, and our point
estimates for K, and f. In table 3 we report the average decomposition from 100 simulated wholesale price
paths. As discussed in the introduction, the price of steel fell steadily over the sample period. Never the
less, by our accounting, the ﬁrm made $375,000 (product 2) and $435,000 (product 4) from the markup
and capital gains on each of these two product over the four-and-a-half year period.9 Ignoring the ﬁxed
order costand the returns from the convenience yield, about 71 percent(product2) and 85 percent(product
4) of these proﬁts came from the markup, while the remaining 29 and 15 percent came from capital gains.
We ﬁnd it remarkable and evidence of the general manager’s acumen in steel trading that the ﬁrm made
positive capital gains over this period despite the price of steel falling about 40 percent. While the ﬁrm’s
success in price speculating is good for its proﬁts, it increases the potential biases from failing to account
for the endogeneity of the sampling process.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Counter-factual uncensored purchase prices (dotted line), censored purchase prices (solid line),
and retail prices (dashed line) for product 4. For the censored purchase price series, the size of the marker
is proportional to the size of the purchase.
47As a diagnostic of our model, we compare the general manager’s performance to the model’s predic-
tions. In this exercise we take as given the 100 interpolated wholesale price series, the ﬁrm’s quantity
demanded series, and the ﬁrm’s initial level of inventories for each product. But in this case, we let the
model’s optimal decision rule dictate when and how much to order.10 Inventories follow the accumulation
identity given by equation (4). As reported in table 3, had the general manager counter-factually followed
the optimal order strategy implied by our model, his discounted proﬁts from the markup would have been
modestly smaller: $2,000 less for product 2; $23,000 less for product 4. However, his capital gains would
have been considerably larger: $63,000 more for product 2; $225,146 more for product 4.
The model implies that the ﬁrm should aggressively price speculate. In ﬁgures 6 and 7 we plot the
prices and inventory holdings for one simulation of the model. In ﬁgure 6 we plot both the actual inven-
tory holdings along with the implied holdings under the model’s decision rules. In ﬁgure 7 we plot the
corresponding retail and wholesale price paths. The model’s counter-factual inventory path differs consid-
erably from the ﬁrm’s actual inventory path. In the beginning of the sample, years 1997 and 1998, when
prices werehigh, themodel impliestheﬁrm shouldhave made frequent smallpurchases and held relatively
low levels of inventories. As was discussed in the introduction, in April 1998 when the wholesale price of
steel dropped from 20 cents per pound to 18.5 cents per pound, the ﬁrm built up its inventory of product 4





￿ bands plotted in ﬁgure 3, the target inventory level at 18.5 cents is around 300,000 pounds. In
April 1998, the ﬁrm’s inventory of product 4 exceeded 2,000,000 pounds.
It is not until December 1999 when prices fell below 13 cents a pound that the model recommends
holding more than 1,000,000 pounds of inventory. However during December 1999 and January 2000, the
general manager let his inventory of product 4 fall to almost zero. The sharp contrast between model’s
counter-factual inventory policy and the ﬁrm’s behavior is also evident during the second half of the sam-
ple. In this period, the ﬁrm held relatively low levels of inventories, whereas the model’s inventory was
often in excess of 2,000,000 pounds. The only time during the sample that the model’s inventory holdings
tracked well the ﬁrm’s inventory holdings was in the ﬁrst half of 2001. Basically, the model recommends
the ﬁrm’s purchasing strategy should have been the opposite of what it did: the ﬁrm should have held low
inventory levels in 1997, 1998 and 1999, and high inventory levels in 2000, 2001, and the start of 2002.
10We placed one ad hoc restriction on our decision rule. In mid-December 2000, the G.M. had an opportunity to buy a
limited quantity of products 2 and 4 for a little over 10 cents per pound. The G.M. bought as much as he could at these
prices. Our model dictated that he should have purchased large quantities at these prices. For the counter-factual experiment
we constrained the model purchase no more steel than we actually observe on these dates.
48This counter-factual exercise is “rigged” in the model’s favor in one dimension and “rigged” against
the model in another. Since we used the entire sample period to both estimate the model and evaluate
the model’s performance, the model “knows” the mean and the standard deviations of prices and quantity
demanded for the entire period. The model knows, whereas the general manager did not know, that a price
of 18.5 cents per pound in the Spring of 1998 was an above-average price for the 1997-2002 period. In
this way the model has an advantage over the manager. However the model is constrained to sell at most
the quantity of steel the general manager actually sold. The model does not get the opportunity make any
sales the general manager might have had the option to make but decided to turn down.
While we do not report an out-of-sample comparison between our model and the general manager,
if we had estimated the model through the Fall of 2001, and then used our model to dictate purchases
for the ﬁrm for the Winter and Spring of 2002, our model would still have outperformed the general
manager. In the Fall of 2001, the ﬁrm was purchasing steel around 10 to 12 cents per pound. We told
the general manager at that time that our model recommended building up inventories at these prices. He
did not follow this advice since he anticipated further price declines. He argued (and to be honest, we
did not disagree) that our model did not take into account the potential slowdown in the economy in the
wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 that he expected to reduce demand for steel. He also
expected new production capacity from the Nucor Corporation to put additional downward pressure on
prices. However, with the bankruptcy of Bethlehem Steel in October 2001 as well as both the anticipation
of an increase and the actual increase in steel tariffs imposed by President Bush in March 2002, steel price
increased about 20 percent in the Spring of 2002 to the 12 to 14 cent range. In the Spring of 2002, we
reminded the general manager that in the fall our model recommended he build up inventories. He sighed,
“I wish I had.”
In this case, our model “got it right” but perhaps not for the right reasons. Our model was predicting an
increase in prices since our model always expects prices to return to the sample mean. Our model does not
use information on where the economy is going as a covariate for predicting steel prices or steel sales. For
example, there is no way for our current model to update expectations of steel prices in response to news,
suchasPresidentBush’sdecisiontoimposesteeltariffs. Toobtainamorerealisticmodelthatmightbeable
to rationalize the general manager’s apparently more cautious speculative strategy, we would need to add
macroeconomic state variables x. Then we could use our model jointly with a macroeconomic forecasting
model to provide conditional inventory level recommendations to the ﬁrm such as “If you expect the
economy to remain strong, the model recommends holding inventories in a range from X to Y; if you
49expect the economy to weaken, ...” These additional state variables would enable us to capture apparently
non-stationary features of steel prices (such as persistently increasing or decreasing price trajectories over





and down in response to news of persistent macroeconomic shocks, helping the model to better ﬁt the
observed purchase and inventory data.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop two econometric procedures for estimating an endogenously-sampled Markov
process. We ﬁrst derive a parametric partial information maximum likelihood (PIML) estimator that solves
the endogenous sampling problem. While the PIML estimator efﬁciently estimates the unknown parame-
ters of a Markov transition probability, it requires repeatedly computing numerical approximations to high
dimensional integrals. Therefore we introduce an alternative consistent, less efﬁcient, simulated minimum
distance (SMD) estimator. This estimation method is computationally simpler than the PIML estimator,
but it still requires solving the dynamic programming problem at each trial value of the unknown param-
eter vector for the endogenous sampling rule. Using this sampling rule, the SMD estimator is able to
consistently estimate the unknown parameters of the Markov process even though the econometrician has
incomplete information on the process.
While this research was motivated by a new dataset from a single steel wholesaler, most datasets in
which agents have the choice of whether and when to participate in a market activity will be endogenously
sampled. In most markets, the only prices recorded are the transaction prices – econometricians almost
never get to observe prices offered but not transacted on. For example, econometricians rarely get to
observe the wages unemployed job seekers are offered but refuse.11 It should be straightforward to apply
the SMD estimator to other types of endogenous sampling problems that arise in time series contexts.
11A counter-example is the limit order books for equities posted on ECNs such as www.island.com. But specialists on the
NYSE are very reluctant to reveal any information about their limit order books.
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53Appendix: Simulating Price Paths with Fixed Starting and Ending Points
We thank Michael Keane for suggesting and explaining this procedure to us.
We assume that wholesale prices follow the AR(1) process given in equation (98) of the paper. To
simplify the presentation in this appendix, let pt denote the log
￿
pt
￿ . Assume we observe pt1 and pt2 on
















￿ that are consistent with both pt1 and pt2 and the law of motion (98). Let t
￿ t2
￿ t1,
be the recurrence time.




















































































where the p denotes the vector of logged prices and the prime denotes the next period’s values.












We then compute the Cholesky decomposition of the (2:t+2,2:t+2) elements of W




￿ ¡h where h is a vector of shocks drawn from a standard normal distribution. Writing in



















































































￿ are random draws from a standard normal distribution. Once the h vector is con-
structed, we use equation (108) to compute the simulated price vector p
-
￿ ¡h
￿ µp. Note that each of the
simulated prices is a function of ht1 and ht2.
To construct a single simulation for the entire time period we repeated this procedure for each interval
between successive purchase dates. For each interval, we then applied an acceptance/rejection criterion.
















￿ for any t1
￿ t
￿ t2. For each interval,
we repeated the procedure described above until we found a path that did not violate the order thresh-
old constraint. For both products there are intervals in the price series in which we could not ﬁnd any
acceptable paths. In these cases, we accepted one of the rejected price paths.
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